Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 27
Issue 2 December 2000

Article 3

2000

Accountability and rhetoric during a crisis: Walt Disney's 1940
letter to stockholders
Joel H. Amernic
Russell J. Craig

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Amernic, Joel H. and Craig, Russell J. (2000) "Accountability and rhetoric during a crisis: Walt Disney's
1940 letter to stockholders," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

ernic and Craig: Accountability and rhetoric during a crisis: Walt Disney's 1940 letter to stockhol
Accounting Historians
Vol. 27, No. 2
December 2000

Journal

Joel H. Amernic
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
and
Russell J. Craig
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

ACCOUNTABILITY AND RHETORIC DURING
A CRISIS: WALT DISNEY'S 1940 LETTER
TO STOCKHOLDERS

Abstract: In 1940, Walt Disney was faced with crafting a message of
corporate accountability under duress. His company, the product of
his creative genius, had been forced to submit to public accountability. It had a pressing need to raise preferred equity finance for a
major expansion during a period of market uncertainty, war, and
reported losses. This paper conducts a "close reading" of the "Letter
to Stockholders" in Walt Disney Productions' 1940 annual report,
the first such letter signed by Walt Disney. The letter's rhetorical features, including metaphor and ideology, are examined in the context of the times. What is revealed is an accountability document
skillfully crafted with the exigencies faced by Disney's company
firmly in mind. The letter offers suggestive insight to the world as
Disney made sense of it. The paper contributes to understanding
the use of rhetoric by top management in activities related to
aspects of financial accountability and reporting. It also helps to
understand better a significant public persona of the 20th century,
Walt Disney.
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
Analysis of annual reports, including letters by CEOs to stockholders, has a long history in management and accounting literatures. Discourse by CEOs is important not only because of the
power that corporate leaders wield in their own organizations,
but also because of their political and cultural influence generally.
Since such discourse may be viewed as a form of sense making
[Weick, 1995], its study also has value because the CEO may be
talking or writing at least partly to himself or herself, and in so
doing creating, justifying, and reacting to the world thus fashioned. We think, talk, and write to help us learn and understand
what we then know [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993;
Weick, 1995]. CEOs are no different.
The many papers which have examined CEOs' letters to shareholders included in corporate annual reports have had a focus
other than exploring the metaphors and ideologies at play within
such discourse (e.g.; Bettman and Weitz [1983]; Salancik and
Meindl [1984]; Hager and Scheiber [1990]; Jones and Shoemaker
[1994]; Abrahamson and Amir [1996]; Thomas [1997]; Courtis
[1998]; Hyland [1998]; Devinney and Kabanoff [1999]). This
paper follows a path largely untrodden in previous studies of
stockholders' letters in accounting annual reports. It explores, by
means of a "close reading," meaning in the narrative of the stockholders' letter of the first public annual report of the global company which still bears Walt Disney's name. Such accountability
narrative merits close reading since it is part of the "battery of
belief-forming institutions" [Tinker, 1985, p. 82] top management
uses to define the language by means of which its self-accounts are
to be written. Our close reading is performed with an interest not
only in "examin[ing] the way discourses are constructed in order
to achieve certain effects" [Eagleton, 1983, p. 205], but also to help
reveal more about the author.
The close reading we conduct is similar to Slagell's [1991, p.
155] "close textual analysis" of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address during the American Civil War, in which she "considers the speech in relation to its historical setting" (pp. 155-156). Of
course, in contrast to an American president's inaugural address,
CEOs' annual letters to stockholders are mundane, common discourses of seemingly minor importance. It is perhaps because of
their commonness and institutionalized, periodic, calendric role
in the functioning of our socioeconomy that such common documents deserve scrutiny. Letters to stockholders, written by CEOs
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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and published in corporate annual reports, are too important a
part of the ideological paraphernalia of our society to be ignored
or brushed aside as mere rhetoric.
The chosen text is the letter to stockholders included in the
annual report of Walt Disney Productions, issued in respect of the
financial year ended September 28, 1940, and signed by Walt
Disney. Disney's company had been compelled to seek outside
capital to finance the expansion of its studio. Our analysis uncovers aspects of the public persona of the then very prominent Walt
Disney, a person reputedly "the most significant figure in graphic
arts since Leonardo" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131, citing
British cartoonist David Low]. He, or his alter ego, is revealed,
inter alia, as a skillful financial and business rhetorician whose discourse reveals ways of thinking that accord with the ideology of
the market [Carrier, 1997]. Such microanalysis of an accountability text prepared by top management is consistent with entreaties
for accounting-related narratives in annual reports to be investigated "to better understand the motives and attitudes of management and the communication process" [Jones and Shoemaker,
1994, p. 174], and, more generally, with polemics in recent
accounting literature encouraging "greater use of narratives in
accounting and management research" [Llewellyn, 1999, p. 233].
The particular Disney stockholders' letter we analyze deserves
special study for three additional reasons:
•First, it is the initial stockholders' letter of the Disney
Company, a corporation that today has global importance in the
entertainment and communications industries.
•Second, the letter was a public and permanent document signed and most likely substantially crafted by Walt Disney
(perhaps with contributions from his brother Roy).1 Thus, it has
potential to provide insight to Disney's public persona at the time
and seems likely to add to historical understanding of this
acknowledgedly charismatic, yet complex business and cultural
leader [Boje, 1995; Bryman, 1995]. We cannot say with certainty
(nor can anyone we expect) that Walt Disney physically drafted

1

Attributing authorship unequivocally to Walt Disney solely or substantially is
difficult if not impossible. While acknowledging this lack of strong, unequivocal
proof of authorship, w e take some solace that it is the "metaphoric Walt," as mentioned in the next footnote, that may be of sustaining importance. As Schickel
11968/1997, p. 44] wrote: "In the last analysis, Walt Disney's greatest creation was
Walt Disney." There is no doubt that the "metaphoric Walt" signed and is accountable for the letter.

Published by eGrove, 2000
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the 1940 stockholders' letter. However, in view of his reputation
for keeping "a sharp eye on financial arrangements" [Capodagli
and Jackson, 1998, p. 185], his multi-skilling philosophy, his acute
awareness of the "bottom line," and his obsession w i t h careful
attention to small detail [Capodagli and Jackson, 1998, pp. 7, 181185], it seems likely that he was strongly implicated. Watts [1997,
p. 260], a Walt Disney biographer, referred to "Walt's comments"
in his brief reference to the company's annual reports of the
1940s. In addition, Schickel's [1968/97, p. 256] detailed descriptions supporting Walt Disney's dominant role and "father figure"
persona in regard to his company, provided strong, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Disney had at least some significant hand in
the letter's crafting.
• Third, since stockholders' letters in recent Disney annual reports make explicit, favorable reference to "Walt" [Amernic,
1998], a "metaphoric Walt" may influence current-day Disney
CEOs.2
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides context for the letter and its analysis. The third section examines
rhetorical qualities of the letter, except for metaphor, which is analyzed in section four. A final section contains concluding comments.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE DISNEY STOCKHOLDERS' LETTER
The Stock Issue—Features, Reasons, Consequences: In 1940, Walt
Disney Productions, as the company was then known, was a relatively small film production studio in terms of financial and tangible assets, but not in terms of reputation, expectations, and innovation. It had just gone public by issuing 155,000 shares of $25 par
value, 6% cumulative, convertible preferred stock (see Exhibit 1).
As a consequence, the Disney brothers' company became publicly
accountable. Its first annual report, for the fiscal year ended
September 28, 1940, was issued in December 1940. That report is
the focus of this paper. Of particular interest is the letter to stockholders, a text not only proffered to the public domain but also
personally associated with the company's chief executive. The letter to stockholders was signed by Walt Disney and was included as
the first main component of the report.
2

A reviewer has drawn attention to the prospect that a "metaphoric Walt"
helps provide flexibility in justifying present business practices of the Disney corporation. He could be used in much the same way as Sam Walton might be used as
an ongoing mythic figure at Wal-Mart Inc.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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EXHIBIT 1
Selected Financial and Other Information About
Walt Disney Productions in 1940

Reported net income or loss for fiscal year ended
September 28. 1940*

A loss of $1,259,798

Total assets reported on balance sheet as of

$8,562,137, of which $4,926,557 represented costs

September 28. 1940*

associated with feature films and short subjects (in
other words, "soft" assets)

Stockholders equity reported on balance sheet as of

$5,787,646

September 28. 1940*?
Number of employees *

1179 (as of September 28. 1940)

Number of feature animated films released in fiscal

one

(Pinocchio)

1940*
Total reported production costs for feature animated

$2,595,380

films released in 1940*
Number of shorts ("cartoons'") released in fiscal
1940*

ten

Average production costs for a cartoon released in
1940#

$22,548

*from 1940 annual report.
#derived from information in 1940 annual report

Disney was prompted to raise capital from the public, according to the New York Times [February 22, 1940, p. 35, col. 7], by an
immediate need to provide permanent capital for the company's
huge expansion program then nearing completion—a $3 million,
51-acre studio complex in Burbank, California. In 1940, Time magazine [March 25, 1940, p. 77] put it thus:
Last week, with its second full-length feature,
Pinocchio, ready for a nation-wide Easter week
opening, Walt Disney productions applied to the
SEC for permission to sell 155,000 shares of $25
par, 6% cumulative convertible preferred stock.
Purpose of the $3,875,000 offering: to pay off
bank loans incurred in building the company's
n e w studio at Burbank, Calif., and to provide working capital for four more features now in production: Bambi, Wind in the Willows, Peter Pan,
Fantasia.
Disney had a long history of reinvesting profits from his animated films and other revenue sources. He did so to meet ever-rising production costs and to help ensure even better films in the
future [Hollister, 1940]. As early as 1934, Fortune magazine [1934,
p. 91] described Disney as reinvesting profits "for the sole purpose of making his films more beautiful, more elaborate, more
Published by eGrove, 2000
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nearly perfect." But, by early 1940, earnings had taken an unexpected battering for three principal reasons: the lukewarm box
office response to Pinocchio, Disney's difficulties in containing
costs, and the effects of the European war.
Bryman [1995, pp. 9-10] summarized the position confronting
Disney:
Largely as a result of Snow Whites success
[released on December 21, 1937], Walt realized
that feature film production had to become the
Studio's main focus, and soon afterwards work
began on Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi. In order
to accomplish this level of production effort...the
[Disney] brothers decided to build a new studio.
In the summer of 1938, they placed a deposit for a
new purpose-built studio in Burbank. In effect,
the new studio building would consume the bulk
of the profits from Snow White. The move was
completed in May 1940, by which time the studio
had about 1,100 employees. The Studio's financial
position began to deteriorate [in 1939]. Both
Fantasia and Pinocchio performed poorly at the
box office and produced sizeable losses, the former especially so, since they had proved very costly to produce. Also, Disney's European market had
all but dried up as a result of the war...the Studio
was heavily in debt and was forced to issue [preferred stock] shares to the public in April 1940, a
move to which the brothers had always been
opposed (emphasis added).
The reasons for the preferred stock issue merit some elaboration. While the audiences responded very positively to Snow
White ("The $1,500,000 borrowed to make Snow White was
repaid within three months..." [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]), there was
always the risk that after the initial successes, the movie-going
public would consider such films just a fad and would quickly lose
interest. Disney's next animated feature, Pinocchio, released in
1940, fared poorly. It was a challenge to create and produce fulllength, animated films involving cartoon characters that audiences would pay to see. The market for feature films of this type
was new and unproven.
Additionally, Disney was struggling to maintain profitability in
an environment characterized by a rapidly changing technology
in animation and movie making. He was confronted by market
uncertainty and considerable production risks posed by the chalhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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lenges of n e w technology (i.e., coping with the special sound
equipment requirements for Fantasia). It was a challenge as well
to maintain control over costs while at the same time striving for
better quality ("The average pay is higher than the average in any
other Hollywood studio" [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]). In a sense, his
problem was similar to that now confronting computer hardware
and software companies.
The European war 3 also had a major impact on the studio by
limiting the company's ability to release pictures in any of the
countries at war. This constrained the market for basic cartoon
shorts and, even more importantly for n e w features. Given the
technological and cost-control risks associated with new, fulllength, animated films, losing the potential to spread some of the
market-acceptance risk was a serious blow — audiences in foreign
markets might have resulted in a future stream of revenues even if
the domestic market eventually regarded these films as mere fads.
Furthermore, currency regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, reduced the company's revenues from pictures already released in foreign countries. And even domestic cinema goers might be less inclined to spend their disposable income
on going to the theater, given the prospect of U.S. involvement in
the war.
So, at the time Walt Disney signed the 1940 letter to stockholders, Walt Disney Productions was in a precarious position. It
had to learn to master n e w technology. It had a product with a
potentially vast market, but that market was largely unproven in
the longer term. The European war was beginning to have an
impact and seemed destined to create further havoc with film distribution and markets, both worldwide and domestically. The intimate control exercised by Disney over every facet of the business 4
was being strained by rapid expansion and the challenges mentioned above, as well as by the need to raise funds through a public stock offering. Schickel [1968/1997, pp. 49, 247] described
Disney's attitude within the context of this difficult time in the following way:
3
Although it had provided significant support to Britain and its allies, the U.S.
did not enter World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
December 7, 1941.
4
According to Hollister [1940, p. 700]: "Walt is the spark plug of production.
No story starts toward a picture until Walt has bought or invented it, shaped it,
tried it out, and given it a push...Throughout the production pattern of every picture Walt threads in and out like a guiding outline...Walt knifes into the most
minute step of the most microscopic element..."
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...The precariousness of the family's livelihood
undoubtedly shaped his own desire not merely to
succeed but to do so in a particular way—namely,
to avoid surrendering any part of his autonomy to
outsiders and to hold his company's stock and its
decision-making power as closely as he could.
...Indeed, in 1938 he had every reason to believe
that he could afford a money-losing experiment
[that is, Fantasia]. But with Pinocchio unable to
perform as expected abroad and with the potentially profitable but difficult Bambi put aside in
order to devote full effort to Fantasia, he was suddenly in perilous straights. Far more than should
have depended on Fantasia.
And the situation worsened even as the film
approached completion. Early in 1940 the banks
shut down the Disney credit line entirely, and in
order to raise operating capital he was forced in
April, 1940, to offer stock to the public for the first
time—a step he feared would mean dilution of his
control over the enterprise...it was a psychological
blow that was perhaps harder for him to take than
it would have been for other men.
To exacerbate matters, the company had incurred a significant loss in 1940 (see Exhibit 1). Thus, it was an opportune time
for Walt Disney to display the charismatic leadership for which he
became famous. The thesis of this article is that he did so partly
through skillful rhetoric employed in the 1940 letter to stockholders. To contextualize further the circumstances leading to the
stock issue and the environmental circumstances in which
Disney's letter to stockholders was composed, it is important to
develop a better understanding of the history of the Disney company and the persona of Walt Disney, subjects to which we now
turn.
Company History: In 1924, Walter Elias Disney, a 23-year-old cartoonist, opened a small animation studio in a storefront in Los
Angeles with his older brother Roy. The business was known as
the "Disney Bros. Studio," but when it moved into new premises
near downtown Los Angeles in 1926, it became the "Walt Disney
Studio." Disney's early ventures endured hardships typical of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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many business startups. 5 Walt Disney went bankrupt before his
move from Kansas City to Los Angeles and his subsequent initial
success in the late 1920s. He is reported to have said: "When I was
21, I went broke for the first time. I slept in chair cushions in my
studio in Kansas City, and ate cold beans out of the can" [Boje,
1995, p. 1024].
The company achieved its first major success w h e n its animated cartoon, Steamboat Willie, featuring the n e w Mickey Mouse
character, was shown at the Colony Theater in New York on
November 18, 1928. Although the company's cartoons were very
popular, by the early 1930s the Walt Disney Studio was struggling
to survive since, among other problems, animation costs continued to rise. But its fortunes were soon to improve. Lucrative merchandising agreements were negotiated, granting permission for
images of Disney characters, such as Mickey Mouse, to be used on
manufactured items. 6 With the release of the company's first feature animated film, Snow White, merchandising agreements w e r e
at the forefront of what was called "a n e w dimension in fashion
merchandising" [Bristol, 1938, p. 13].7 The introduction of color to
improve cartoon quality led to an Academy Award and commercial
success for the studio's first color cartoon, Flowers and Trees.
Other innovations in animation, such as providing cartoon characters with unique, focused personalities (as in The Three Little
Pigs and for characters such as Pluto, Donald Duck, and Goofy)
appealed to Depression-era audiences.

5

Problems included decreasing profit margins on their products (cartoons) as
they endeavored to make technical improvements to satisfy their market, as well as
hardball tactics by their financial backers (who lured away several of Disney's animators). The material for this and several following paragraphs draws u p o n
Bryman [1995], unless otherwise noted.
6
The New Internationalist [1998], the Walt Disney Company 1997 Fact Book,
and de Cordova [1994] are drawn upon to disclose that, "In 1930 the first international licensing contract for the sale of Mickey Mouse m e r c h a n d i s e was
signed... [and that] ...the first Mickey Mouse watch was sold by Ingersoll Watch
Company in June, 1933" [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 19].
7
Disney's approach to licensing his animated characters for commercial
exploitation was highly successful very quickly: "...in 1932 sales of Disney character articles had totaled $300,000, in 1937 they were $35,000,000" [Bristol, 1938, p.
15]. That success has become institutionalized; in modern times there is a well
established and curiously seamless fusion of cinematic art with consumerism:
"Every Disney animated film comes bundled with a complete marketing strategy
for merchandise, interactive games and a line of children's books" [ N e w
Internationalist, 1998, p. 28].
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By 1934, the company employed 187 staff. Walt Disney decided to expand into the feature film business since "it was becoming
increasingly difficult to combine the growing costs of animation...
with the inherently limited returns that could accrue from shorts"
[Bryman, 1995, p. 9]. The company's first feature-length animation movie, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, which opened on
December 21, 1937, was a great success, at first critically and then
commercially.8 The company began other animated features
(Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi), while continuing to produce
cartoon shorts. It soon outgrew its studio facilities. Plans for a
new, custom-designed studio were hatched in the summer of
1938, and the company, now with about 1,100 employees and
called "Walt Disney Productions," moved into its new studio in
May 1940. The decision to focus much of the company's efforts on
very expensive but potentially very profitable feature animated
films, as well as the related need for new production facilities,
prompted the company to raise funds from the public through a
preferred stock issue in April 1940. It subsequently released its
first published annual report in December of that year.
Disney Persona: By 1940, Walt Disney was acclaimed widely as an
international success. Indeed, even by the early 1930s, Disney had
reached a position of eminence that matched the greatest of
Hollywood stars. His admirers included Italian conductor
Toscanini and Russian film director Eisenstein, among a glittering
array of adoring fans [Costantino, 1991, p. 12]. Disney's Mickey
Mouse character became "a national figure, an international
attraction, and finally a cultural totem" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988,
p. 130]. Critics from New York to Leningrad were said to "gravely
laud him" [Fortune, 1934, p. 89].9 In 1934, his comedies were
exhibited in 88 countries, and he was said to be "an international
hero, better known than Roosevelt or Hitler, a part of the folklore
of the world" (p. 89). Watts [1997, p. 124] described the cultural
influence of Disney in the 1930s in the following way:

8

One wonders whether modern-day audiences would have been so receptive
to a female hero who was "young, virginal, pretty, sweet-natured and obedient" and
unfazed by domestic drudgery through absolute belief that "a handsome owningclass chap [would], someday soon, come and save her" [Maio, 1998, p. 12].
9
A11 references in this section are taken from Fortune [ 1934], unless otherwise
indicated.
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Universities...provided reinforcement for the
notion of Disney animation as art. In 1933, the
College Art Association helped arrange an exhibition of Disney drawings in New York. Five years
later, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Southern
California granted h o n o r a r y degrees to Walt
Disney...
The lengthy and major profile of Disney and his film-making
operations in Fortune magazine in 1934 portrayed him as a mythmaker. His products were said to enthrall audiences throughout
the world by bringing them to a "delicate balance between fantasy and fact, poetry and comic reality." They were said to appeal to
the simplest emotions and to give pleasure. They had "plasticity" —
nothing in a Disney film was impossible (p. 88). The themes of his
cartoons were such that "courage overcomes wickedness and fear;
industry triumphs over dalliance; false ambition gives way to resignation" (p. 88). In sum, they were short morality plays. They
were the epitome also of what has become known as "disneyfication" — "sanitized, safe, entertaining and predictable" entertainment [Ellwood, 1998, p. 8].
Disney has been described as a moody, deliberately "ordinary,"
informal man who, although having "rural gusto and naive fancy"
(p. 90), nonetheless had an imagination renowned for its fantastic
quality (p. 146). He was a stickler for high artistic standards; he
made daring and innovative use of music, sound, and folk material; and he was reported to "mistrust the shoddiness and hypocrisy
of the pseudo-artist" (p. 146). His personality was said to have
been shaped by "a nostalgic yearning for romance or simple values" and to have been affected by a "frugal, authoritarian and
moralistic" father [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8].
But as Boje [1995] has argued, Disney had a "darker side." The
Dictionary of American Biography claimed that Disney became
"self-satisfied, intractable, arrogant" and was "probably never the
quite generous father of a gifted flock that he seemed on the surface" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. "The discerning eye," it
was said, could find in his programs "breaches of taste, philistine
wisecracks, a milking of the nostalgic mood, slipshod cultural references, a growing dependence on received folklore and other
people's classics, and an increasingly slick technical achievement
of rather tawdry effects" [Garrety and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. His
character Mickey Mouse was said to have been flawed by a streak
of sadism, and the film Fantasia was adjudged by some as a "prePublished by eGrove, 2000
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tentious hodgepodge." He was alleged to be "both paternalistic
and domineering...he brooked no dissent, rewarding loyalists w i t h
favors and punishing dissidents" [New Internationalist,
1998, p.
8].
RHETORICAL QUALITIES OF THE 1940
LETTER TO STOCKHOLDERS
The Writer: In 1940, Walt Disney was not just another ordinary
corporate CEO writing a stockholders' letter for the first annual
report of a relatively small, n e w public company. As w e have
shown above, he was a cultural sensation. He had been written
about rather extensively in the 1930s in major national publications such as Fortune, New Yorker, American
Magazine,
Scribners, New York Times Magazine, Time, etc. [Bryman, 1995].
He was also someone w h o guarded with zeal his prerogatives to
lead and to control the results of his genius [Hollister, 1940]. As
Bryman [1995, p. 10] claimed, he was "forced" to issue shares
because of the company's debt. How might a cultural icon, w h o s e
creative genius had long been publicly acknowledged, contemplate the writing of a stockholders' letter as part of a compelled
accountability flowing from the apparently unwanted, but financially necessary, public offering? This question is important in a
rhetorical sense since "the speaker's life, insofar as it is public,
forms a long prelude to his speech" [Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, 1958, p. 320].
The Audience: Modern annual reports, including the stockholders' letter, often have many audiences with diverse and partly conflicting interests. These audiences include current and potential
stockholders and debt holders, financial intermediaries, employees, unions, competitors and the public-at-large, among others.
While it seems reasonable to surmise that Disney's 1940 letter was
an important part of financial reporting intended for similar
diverse constituencies, perhaps the first among equals was the
n e w group of preferred stockholders. Disney was in a somewhat
invidious position for he had just been provided a financial lifeline
to sustain his company. He was confronted with the problem of
crafting a document mainly intended for the company's n e w preferred stockholders. He needed to be alert to the potential they
had to constrain his ownership and his pursuit of all things associated with his icon status. He would need to acknowledge the various operating and market difficulties the company had faced and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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the difficulties it might face in the future. Additionally, he would
have to explain effectively how top management (that is, the
Disney brothers) was firmly in control and leading the company
towards future success. In clear and compelling terms, he would
need to analyze the company's performance and prospects so as to
encourage strong and unwavering adherence to Disney's leadership of the newly public company. His letter would have to serve
as a public vehicle for sense making [Weick 1995, p. 13] by preferred stockholders and others interested in the company, including himself and his brother.
Rhetorical Characteristics of the Initial Substantive Section: The
1940 "Letter to Stockholders" is reproduced in Appendix 1. Its second section, following immediately after the w a r m but respectful
welcome, is headed "NEW STUDIO." It is reproduced below with
each sentence labeled for reference:
NEW STUDIO
[Sentence 1] At the time of the sale of the 6%
Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was
c o n s t r u c t i n g and e q u i p p i n g its n e w studio.
[Sentence 2] This studio was substantially completed and e q u i p p e d and virtually all of the
Company's p r o d u c t i o n operations w e r e transferred thereto by the end of May, 1940. [Sentence
3] As a result of the increased facilities, the
Company has been able to augment its production
of completed footage by more than 100% and has
succeeded in lowering the cost of production per
foot substantially. [Sentence 4] Therefore, the
Company will be able to carry out its n e w policy
of releasing two or more feature subjects each
year as well as a large number of short subjects.
[Sentence 5] As a result of the reduction in costs,
short subjects are now being produced at a figure
which the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer
available.
Sentence 1 links the preferred stock issue (that is, the resources
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provided by the "Stockholders" to whom the entire letter is
addressed) with the positive, forceful activities of "constructing
and equipping." While the "ing" endings are a weak example of
rhetorical use of repetition (homoioteleuton), the effect is made
rhetorically stronger by culminating in the fulfillment of a major
task ("completed," "transferred," "succeeded"). This is an extremely positive section of the letter, with good use of forceful action
words and a strong sense of direction. Indeed, Sentence 4 beginning "Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new
policy..." assures that promises will be kept and that the company
has a logical, rational plan unfolding as it should. It establishes the
following close, sequential linkage:
New financial resources from preferred stock issue
New, larger studio
Increased capacity and efficiency
Lower unit costs
Increase in number of features released and short subjects
Expected profits
This piling-up of arguments in support of expected profits,
rhetorically a sort of diallage, which Lanham [1991, p. 51]
explained as "bringing several arguments to establish a single
point," creates a sense of moving forward with an active, in-control management in charge.10
10

Within this piling-up of arguments are other rhetorical devices. First, repetition of the phrase "As a result o f at the start of sentence three and sentence five
interlaces two references to cost reduction. Such phrasal repetition verges on
anaphora, whereby the same words "are repeated at the beginning of successive
clauses..." [Lanham, 1991, p. 11]. Second, the use of action-oriented, decisive words
and phrases such as "At the time of the sale;" "was constructing," "was substantially completed;" "were transferred;" "As a result of;" "has succeeded;" "Therefore;"
"will be able," "now being produced;" and "will result in" is the textual equivalent
of epitrochasmus; that is, "a swift movement from one statement to the next; rapid
touching on many different points" [Lanham, 1991, p. 70].
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There is also a short, almost completely self-contained, fivesentence, morality-tale narrative of the American success story in
this passage. It seems fitting that Disney the storyteller would
incorporate narrative into his CEO discourse in the stockholders'
letter. After all, if important external constituencies, and internal
ones as well, buy into top management's strategic narrative, such
discourse has certainly served its purpose [Barry and Elmes,
1997]. The uncertainty associated with the business is incorporated subtly, almost unobtrusively, by the use of words "substantially"
and "believes" and the rather soft introduction of the threat to
"sources of income in certain foreign countries n o w at war."
The story narrated in this passage seems almost as fictional as
a Disney cartoon, thereby making the rhetorical quality of the section more interesting. The company had borrowed considerably
to establish its n e w facilities and expand its work force. It had
done so believing that more lucrative opportunities would flow
from animated features rather than from short subjects. But cost
control problems, some market resistance, and the European war
had intervened. This had compelled the Disney brothers to do
something they did not want to do — issue preferred stock to
reduce part of the debt and provide them with some liquid funds.
Given these events, it is contestable w h e t h e r Disney was in control of his company to the extent that might be demanded. Thus,
his use of rhetoric was adept and skillful impression management,
directed to portraying what was arguably a mirage; that is, of
Disney being decisive and in control of all dimensions of his company's affairs [Salancik and Meindl, 1984].
"EFFECTS OF THE WAR'' and "PRODUCT": The contrast between
the second and third sections is dramatic. While the second section was upbeat and optimistic, there unfolds in the third section
a series of negative news about the impact of the war, again characteristic of diallage. The first sentence of this section ["The effect
of the war in Europe u p o n the affairs of your Company has been
serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined"
(emphasis added)], stands in stark contrast to the previous section's final sentence in which the war was blamed almost as an
afterthought for making "sources of income in certain foreign
countries" "no longer available." Why the sharp, sudden alteration
in message? Perhaps it had to do with Walt Disney's problems as a
leader and an entrepreneur in 1940. He had an unpalatable story
to tell in his company's first public annual report, especially about
the almost catastrophic problems with Pinocchio. According to
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the 1940 annual report, $1 million of the $2.6 million cost of producing this animated feature was written off during the year
because of the combined effects of market conditions and the
excessive costs. (See Appendix 1 under the heading "PINOCCHIO.") Thus, first serving up some bad news about the impact of
the war, the effect of which had already been marginalized to
some degree at the end of the previous section, might be seen as
a skillful use of "order" as a rhetorical device.
But the rhetoric is even more skillful and subtle. Disney refers
to "the" Company on 44 occasions in the letter. Only once, and in
this section, does he refer to "your" Company. In doing so, he
heightens the emphatic effect, helping to steer home the implications of the bad news to shareholders. His tone, for whatever reason, is almost accusatory, as if the shareholders were answerable
for the bad news.
The letter begins with very good news about increasing production, reducing costs, and anticipating profits. These successes
were due to factors presumably controllable by management. The
next section describes the potential impact of the war in very
general terms — the war being, of course, beyond the control of
management. The following section, headed "PRODUCT,"
describes the even more sombre news about Pinocchio and the
possible bad news about Fantasia. The bad news about Pinocchio
is first reported as due to "the conditions prevailing throughout
the world" (see subsection headed "PINOCCHIO"), in other
words, beyond management's control. Despite this, later in the
same subsection, the letter mentions the company's growth ("the
transition period through which the Company passed when it
changed its policy of making one feature in two years...to a policy
of producing from two to four features a year...") and the "discarded work of untrained personnel," "the schooling and training of
personnel," and "inadequate plant facilities" before moving into
the new studio.
The portion of the third section devoted to Fantasia reminds
the reader that the company is an innovator, and that innovation
sometimes requires changing strategies and profit expectations.
The remainder of the fourth section provides a barrage of upbeat
news about new animated features, cartoons in process, and other
sources of revenue.
Disney's Rhetorical Use of Accounting: Aho [ 1985] and Carruthers
and Espeland [1991] have argued that accounting is powerfully
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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rhetorical. Disney displayed an innate understanding of this feature of accounting in his stockholders' letter. Under the heading
"GENERAL," Disney attacks the strictures of accounting convention by invoking a statement made in the company's formal, legal
prospectus inviting subscriptions in the preferred stock issue. The
portion of the section reads as follows (sentences are n u m b e r e d
for reference purposes):
[Sentence 1] In considering the profit and loss
statement of the Company, it is worth while to
repeat the following statement made in t h e
prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred
Stock:
[Sentence 2] "The Company's principal income
accrues according to the rapidity with which its
features are exhibited in theatres and, accordingly,
the relationship between dates of release and
dates of accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to
produce wide variations in earnings as they may
from time to time be reported. [Sentence 3] This
is made more pronounced by a program which
contemplates the release of only one or two features per year. [Sentence 4] In connection with
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the
Company adopted a policy of writing off the
entire cost of the picture against the first revenues
received, and the Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions. [Sentence 5] Consequently, if any given
accounting period closes at a time w h e n revenues
have failed to exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released
during such period, it is possible that a loss may be
reported in such period notwithstanding the fact
that an actual profit may eventually be realized on
such feature."
In Sentence 1, Disney invokes the authority of the prospectus,
a legal document that had been approved by the California authorities. This appeal to authority, or apomnemonysis
[Lanham, 1991,
p. 191], gives added weight to the text. Such a rhetorical move is
quite consistent with the central role that appeal to authority,
often embodied in GAAP, serves in modern accounting. The
Published by eGrove, 2000

17

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 3
66

Accounting

Historians Journal, December 2000

prospectus excerpt is cited in sentences 2, 3, and 4 to tell of the
company's virtuous accounting by which the entire cost of animated features is written off against the first revenues received, a
conservative accounting policy, at least in the short run. In sentence 5, the excerpt suggests strongly that resulting accounting
losses are an artifact of the interplay between this conservative
accounting policy and the arbitrariness of the relationship
between accounting periods and revenues. In effect, Disney signals to the letter's readers the company's sobriety of purpose by
using a conservative method of accounting. 11 But h e t h e n draws
u p o n this excerpt from the preferred stock prospectus to urge
readers not to take t h e resultant accounting too seriously.
Rhetorically, he seems to want to have it both ways; e.g., conservative accounting shows evidence of the social virtue of conservatism, but accounting itself can be relied u p o n only to an extent.
Can he have it both ways?12 Can Disney both draw u p o n the
authority of accounting to influence readers and almost at the
same time plead the arbitrariness of certain accounting conventions, such as the accounting period convention? Accounting is
such a rhetorically serviceable and elastic mode of representation
and argument that it is not surprising that Disney, the creative storyteller, employs it thus.
However, the conservative method of revenue recognition
chosen by Disney had a decidedly unconservative side as well.
Feature animated films whose costs had been fully recovered
could be taken off the shelf and distributed again with 100% of the
producer's revenues during these re-releases going directly to the
company's before-tax profits. This happened with Snow White in
1940—that year's income statement in the annual report included
revenues of $103,526 from the reissue of Snow White, but
revealed no costs in 1940 since all production costs for the picture
had b e e n recovered in previous years. So the conservative
accounting used by Disney had a temporal dimension—very conservative in early years in which feature film production activity
was high and unconservative once such features were completed

11

Indeed, the financial statement footnotes in the 1940 annual report reveal
the method of accounting to be conservative twice over. Not only were profits on
an animated feature not admitted to the company's accounting system until all of a
feature's costs of production had been recovered, but Disney did not account for
any revenues at all until cash was received from a film's distributor.
12
A reviewer raised this dual nature of accounting argument in the stockholders' letter.
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and went into re-release. Since 1940 was one of these "early years,"
this unconservative side remained unobtrusive during the crucial
year of 1940.
In the 1941 stockholders' letter, Walt Disney demonstrated further his rhetorical capability to use accounting strategically. He
constructed, or more likely had his accountants construct, a
detailed accounting comparison between the company's 1941 and
its 1940 results. He included this comparison near the beginning
of the 1941 letter (see Appendix 2). He was using accounting
information to show that in spite of a reported loss of $789,297 in
1941, many features highlighted in this artfully constructed comparison suggested strongly that great progress had been made in
1941 as compared with 1940. Constructing such an unusual
accounting schedule and placing it near the front of his stockholders' letter, where it more or less dominated and conditioned
perceptions of the rest of the letter and perhaps the rest of the
entire 1941 annual report, was a skillful rhetorical move. The
authority of the accounting information used, drawn from the
audited financial statements, was apomnemonysis combined with
"order" in persuasive harmony.
The "Summary of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement,"
presented in the 1941 Stockholders' Letter, seems skillful rhetorically in another sense as well. It presented a gross mass of numbers across 3 x 8 digit columns, 26 rows long. Clearly, the notions
of accounting materiality and "rounding" had not been embraced
by Disney or his accounting advisors, as the financial data were
presented to the precise dollar and cent. Although this may have
reflected Disney's reputation for "attention to detail," it may also
have been a rhetorical ploy. This so-called "Summary" was a visual
onslaught likely to test, and find wanting, all but the most determined, accounting-trained readers. Perhaps it was a visual
metaphor used as a rhetorical device, a way for Disney to vent his
frustration with the complexity and confounding nature of
accounting methods and practices. For such a skillful graphic
artist, one who was renowned for the most beautiful of screen
images, the "Financial Summary" was out of character. Whereas
Disney was a creative graphic artist, adept at fashioning compelling and beautiful screen images, when it came to conscripting
something as mundane as accounting data to craft the (financial)
story he wished to tell, the end result was metaphorically a barrage of numbers bereft of aesthetic appeal, but perhaps a classic
rhetoric move. More simply however, this could have merely been
brother Roy's influence.
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The Rhetoric of an Accountability Document: It is not surprising
to find that the 1940 letter to stockholders was well constructed
rhetorically. After all, Walt Disney had by this time a universal reputation as a master storyteller. So why would he not use this talent
in telling his company's financial story during a period of crisis in
a way that might be expected to garner positive reaction from his
audience? Financial reporting, in both its qualitative and quantitative aspects, is like all text, and discourse generally, unavoidably
rhetorical. Disney was as skilled at giving a financial account as he
was at giving an account of Mickey's latest adventure.
Understanding the inherent rhetorical nature of such discourse is
important to understanding the role such discourse plays in
accountability.
Indeed, in any accountability document (such as a set of audited financial statements, a stockholders' letter, a variance report, a
corporate press release), there is a vast array of rhetorical choices
available which the author might apply with greater or lesser
degrees of awareness. Such choices, made even subconsciously by
the author, influence the perceptions of the audience. Our analysis of some rhetoric features of Disney's letter has merely touched
the surface of possibilities; for example, we might have explored
more deeply the argument schemes apparent in the letter
[Warnick and Kline, 1992], examined ways in which the letter
dealt rhetorically with its composite audiences [Myers, 1999], analyzed text structure, and metadiscourse [Hyland, 1998], etc.
Having established, we submit, that the letter was crafted skillfully in a rhetorical sense, we now focus our attention on the nexus
between rhetoric and ideology. We read Disney's letter with
metaphor uppermost in mind since it is largely through metaphor
that we might begin to understand a text's "ideological agenda
that is apt to be hidden from view" [Postman, 1993, p. 124].
METAPHOR IN THE 1940 LETTER
Metaphor is a central aspect of rhetoric. Among recent contributors to the extensive literature on metaphor, Eubanks [ 1999,
p. 195] has made a case that:
...metaphor is rhetorically constituted. No
metaphor is spoken or written except in the context of a sociohistorically bound communicative
situation. Therefore, all metaphors are inflected by
politics, economics, philosophy, social interests,
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professional commitments, and personal attitudes
— in short by the whole of our cultural and conceptual repertoire. Because metaphors are inflected, we cannot explain how they work unless we
consider concrete instances of metaphor, taking
into account h o w inflections constrain the way
metaphors are uttered and understood.
Eubanks asserted that metaphors are "fundamentally responsive," and thus cannot be understood by themselves (i.e., "atomized"), but rather only in relation to "metaphoric and literal concepts that are already in motion within a culture's (or subculture's) discourse." As a consequence:
Because metaphors are concretely responsive and
because c o m p e t e n t speakers and w r i t e r s are
aware, consciously and unconsciously, of the
interplay of metaphors and concepts, the utterance of a metaphor carries rhetorical benefits or
costs...Speakers and writers build consensus and
risk rhetorical capital w h e n selecting and reenvoicing metaphors. However, they manage that
risk complexly by claiming, ascribing, and shifting
the metaphors they utter [Eubanks, 1999, pp. 195196].
Metaphor theory has a long, rich, and unsettled history. Some
contend that metaphor is simply flowery but unnecessary. But
many scholars would agree with Postman [1996, p. 174] that "a
metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception."
Others suggest intriguingly that thought itself is fundamentally
metaphorical [Gibbs, 1994], and that metaphorical language is
merely the surface manifestation of an underlying cognitive mapping between two domains—a target domain and a source domain
[Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993]. Considerable persuasive
evidence, much of it summarized by Gibbs [1994], provides support for the view that metaphor is basic to thought, and that there
are systematic relationships among metaphorical structures. For
example, Lakoff [1993, pp. 222-224] wrote about a metaphorical
mapping hierarchy whose highest level is the fundamental "event
structure" metaphor.
Scholars in a wide variety of fields have taken up the seriousness of metaphor. Harrington [1995] argued persuasively that
G e r m a n race ideology was made m o r e virulent t h r o u g h
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metaphoric processes; Dunn [1990] showed how the "root
metaphor" of the new industrial relations has facilitated the erection of a new industrial relations paradigm; Miller and Fredericks
[1990] argued that metaphors used in a major educational policy
document revealed a particular ideological predisposition that
foreclosed alternative recommendations; Daughton [1993]
claimed that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's use of metaphor of a
holy war contributed to the immediate impact and enduring influence of his first inaugural speech; and Postman [1996, p. 174]
pleaded rhetorically and, of course, metaphorically to educators
by asking: "Do I exaggerate in saying that a student cannot understand what a subject is about without some understanding of the
metaphors that are its foundation?"
We suggest that the metaphor, "the company is a sentient
being on a purposeful journey traversing an at-times hostile environment," permeates the 1940 Disney stockholders' letter, and
that this metaphor is consistent with the fundamental and pervasive event-structure metaphor hierarchy described by Lakoff
[1993]. Evidence supporting this contention includes the following metaphoric language from the section headed "NEW STUDIO": (1) "...the Company was constructing and equipping its new
studio," (2) "...the Company's production operations...," (3) "...the
Company has been able to augment its production...," (4) "...the
Company will be able to carry out its new policy..." These may be
argued to be instances of verbal reification, but they are also
instances of attributing sentience and purposiveness to the
Company. Such ways of talking and writing about companies are
commonplace, and it is perhaps because they are commonplace
that they are rhetorically important.
There are numerous other instances of reification of the company as an active agent that has commercial "affairs" (e.g., "EFFECT
OF THE WAR": "The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of
your Company..."); that takes action (e.g., "PRODUCT": "...the
Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc."); that enjoys benefits (e.g., "PINOCCHIO": "...there have accrued to the credit of the
Company..."); that creates saleable names and characters (e.g.,
"SHORT SUBJECTS"); that has expectations about the future (e.g.,
"GENERAL": "...the Company expects to have three new feature
pictures in general release..."), etc. Perhaps the most important
language manifestation of this metaphor is under the heading
"PINOCCHIO" in which Disney writes: "...the transition period
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3
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making one feature in two years...to a policy of producing from
two to four features a year." Here, we have a company that not only
pursues the sentient activity of changing a policy, but also has to
endure passage through a transition period on its journey.
An obvious objection to this analysis might be that these are
merely words, and besides, many managers talk and write about
their company in similar ways. But that is the point; "managers
work with words" [Jonsson, 1998, p. 411]. The modern theory of
metaphor suggests strongly that words matter because they influence the way those uttering those words think and act.
Calling a company "a sentient being on a purposeful journey
traversing an at-times hostile environment" has several implications and entailments. The company, a sentient being, knows best
through its means of cognition and decision making (i.e., its leadership) about its goals and how to achieve them; about which path
through the at-times hostile environment to take; and h o w to
adapt w h e n circumstances change. Therefore, acknowledging the
interests of other stakeholders is limited and perhaps utilitarian.
These other stakeholders are not part of the being itself (i.e., the
company) unless they submit to the authority of the company as a
sentient being—a strongly managerialist view. Further, any obstacles in the path are adversaries and goals are non-negotiable. 13 To
see the consistency of these ideas in Disney's managerial discourse, w e take a brief look at the 1941 stockholders' letter (see
Appendix 2).
In the section "LABOR RELATIONS" in the 1941 stockholders'
letter, Disney describes the company's journey as "beset by labor
troubles" and ventures the observation that this obstacle to purposeful travel has occurred in 1941 "[f]or the first time in its history." This section describes Disney's view of the famous 1941
strike, a view in sharp contrast to Disney's hostile, and perhaps at
13

A reviewer, rightly in our view, proffered objections to a version of this
metaphor which we called "the company is a sentient being on a purposeful journey" as follows: "Could there be an explanation that is a little less grand? Basic company law tells us that limited liability companies enjoy separate legal form. It could
simply be that what is seen here is a playing out of that, with the company being
accorded its own identity in the text as a consequence of this commonplace
usage..." While undoubtedly this is true, a reader of Disney's stockholders' letter
would be p r u d e n t not to ignore the strong, pervasive strain of Midwestern independence that several scholars have attributed to Walt Disney [Bryman, 1995;
Schickel, 1968/1997; Watts, 1997] and which seems to have conditioned greatly his
conception and attitudes towards his company, the product of his creative, emotional, and physical labors.
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times illegal, anti-union activity summarized in Boje [1995],
Schickel [1968/1997], and Watts [1997]. If we think of a "company as a sentient being on a purposeful journey," then what do we
think of the people who attempt to unionize and impede the journey? Disney characterizes the 1941 cutbacks which led in part to
the union activity and to a subsequent strike as a
"program...designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution of the Company's pictures under present world conditions." He portrayed it as a technical problem that required a reasonable technical solution. Thus,
the union advocates and strikers, who Boje [1995, pp. 1014-1015]
pointed out had several complaints about their inequitable treatment by Disney, were the source of the "labor troubles" that
"beset" the company. The impression is one of Big Labor and its
goons ganging up on the company (the American Federation Of
Labor is mentioned, as are "secondary boycotts" and "'hot cargo'
activities"). The arbitration award is described as being "imposed"
on the company (the word is used twice in the section). So the
metaphor established in the 1940 stockholders' letter is carried
over to the 1941 letter and is consistent in its entailments: unreasonable employees joined a union and went on strike, preventing
the company from implementing a reasonable program to help it
on its journey. Then, despite "[r]epeated efforts by the Company
to effect a settlement," government came in and arbitrated a settlement, which imposed several bad things, further impeding the
journey. However, everything "is now operating smoothly" in
spite of these obstacles.
Despite these comforting words, Disney was apparently in no
mood to have future journeys disrupted by what he regarded as
ideologically perverted union behavior. The 1941 strike is said to
have caused him to become "a militant anti-communist" and, in
the 1950s, "a [secret] special FBI agent charged with passing on
information about supposed communist infiltration" of
Hollywood [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. His embrace of a
business structure of vertical integration in which, for example,
his company controls not only the production of film and television programs, but also controls their distribution and associated
product licensing and retail merchandising sales, points to the
adoption of the metaphor of the uninterrupted journey as a tangible business goal.
Carrier [1997, p. 51] described "a public language" of "the
Market model" which he alleged:
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...provides the vocabulary and conceptual equipment that make it relatively easy to define certain
sorts of things as problems and relatively hard to
define other sorts of things that way. Just as it
influences the sorts of problems that can be
addressed, so it influences what is likely to appear
as an acceptable, plausible solution.
Like a lingua franca, such a version of the "Market" helps create "an
external reality that [people] have to adopt if they are to communicate with others" [Carrier, 1997, p. 49]. Carrier was concerned
with the idea of the "Free Market" in the 1990s, and h o w such a
richly complex metaphor affects people's arguments, decisions,
and public debates. He traced the most important historical roots
of the "Market" to 18th and 19th century Britain. Importantly for
purposes of this paper, he concluded that "...in popular consciousness the idea flourishes best in the United States, with its
long traditions of that secular, acquisitive individualism and concern with equality of process rather than of outcome that form
part of the Market" [Carrier, 1997, p. vii].
Disney's ideological notion of his company is metaphorical in
the same sense as Carrier's notion of the "Market." Disney's company is related intimately to Carrier's "Market," for the company
metaphorically pursues its life-journey largely by entering into
transactions within the ambit of this metaphorical market. And
since, as Carrier [1997] reminded us, such a metaphorical market
is a "Free Market," anything that interferes with such metaphorical
freedom is to be treated with non-metaphorical hostility (e.g., the
national labor union with which Disney's striking employees
allied themselves in 1941). Perhaps warfare was not restricted,
metaphorically or otherwise, just to Europe in 1941.
Eubanks' [1999, p. 195] contention that "all metaphors are
inflected by politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, professional commitments, and personal attitudes" seems apt here
since the fiercely independent and self-made Disney probably
could conceive of his company in no way other than the
metaphoric representation described above. His discourse in the
1940 and 1941 stockholders' letters set out his ideology and philosophy of management and management control. Such discourse
represented, in effect, the way he made sense of the world.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have used the themes of rhetoric and metaphor to examine the 1940 stockholders' letter of Walt Disney Productions, the
first such accountability document signed by Walt Disney, and, to
a lesser extent, the 1941 letter. These letters provide an accounting, a story, that Disney intended to craft within the confines of
the tensions between his company's financial exigencies and his
creative, iconic persona. Walt Disney was as skilled in designing
financial reporting and accountability narrative and discourse as
he was in creating animated cartoons and features. The letters
seem crafted with the goal to forge allegiance with the new preferred stockholders firmly in mind in spite of his strong resentment. And if we take seriously the current literature of cognitive
metaphor, the letters also reveal features of Disney's thinking,
especially about key social and economic institutions. In sum,
although the narrative part of financial accounting examined here
is rhetorically and linguistic complex, the analyses conducted
expose the types of insights that help render management and the
companies they lead more understandable. Disney as accountant
was ever as complex as Disney the cultural icon.
An ongoing and important task addressed by historians is that
of revealing and analyzing the character, personality, and behavior
of corporations and their CEOs. In pursuing that task, important
insights about corporations and individuals have been sourced
from many quarters. But rarely have historians delved into the
narrative discourse of CEOs in annual reports when seeking to
add to the arsenal of information they marshal in support of biographic profiles, corporate histories, or other historical text. This
paper provides an example of how analysis of narrative discourse
by CEOs in annual reports can add to and enrich understanding of
leading corporations and their chief executives.
The insights offered through adoption of a "close reading" of
CEO text have been demonstrated clearly here. By focusing on the
rhetorical, metaphorical, and ideological features of Walt Disney's
1940 letter to stockholders, insight into the behavior and character of Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation is provided. Our
analysis reveals Walt Disney to be a skillful, yet subtle rhetorician,
whose rhetorical capabilities encompass a deft capacity to manipulate accounting data strategically. Disney was not only a master
storyteller in the surreal surrounds of the cinema where he could
exploit the glitz and glamor of visual and sound imagery. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, he is revealed as very adept also in a grey
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and glamor-free domain with which few would remotely imagine
associating him — financial reporting. Our analysis reveals Disney
as a very clever storyteller in weaving rhetorical magic in the
realm of the mundane — accountability narratives in an annual
report.
By exploring Disney's use of metaphor, w e show h o w further
perspectives can be developed and h o w this assists us in entering
theoretical speculations about Disney's ideological motivations.
Our analysis yields results which, in the main, are contrary to the
popular, ambient image of Walt Disney; that is, as the wholesome,
friendly "Uncle Walt." Somewhat perversely, w e find evidence
consistent with what w e reported earlier as Walt Disney's "darker
side." He is revealed as something of an enigma, the cultural icon
w h o seemed almost as adept at crafting financial narrative in a
hard-nosed business world as he was at fashioning animation.
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APPENDIX 1
Letter to Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions
Annual Report
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney
Productions:
In April, 1940, Walt Disney Productions sought and obtained the participation of the public
in its business through the sale of 155,000 shares of 6% Cumulative Convertible Preferred
Stock, and the Board of Directors herewith submits its first annual report to the Company's
n e w stockholders.
Included herein are financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ended September
28, 1940, accompanied by the report of the Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse &
Co. We invite your attention to the notes which are attached to and constitute an integral part
of the financial statements.
Your management believes that it will be of interest to our 1,800 stockholders to supplement
the information shown in the financial statements with the following additional facts pertaining to the Company.
NEW STUDIO
At the time of the sale of the 6% Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was constructing
and equipping its n e w studio. This studio was substantially completed and equipped and virtually all of the Company's production operations were transferred thereto by the end of May,
1940. As a result of the increased facilities, the Company has been able to augment its production of completed footage by more than 100% and has succeeded in lowering the cost of production per foot substantially. Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its n e w policy
of releasing two or more feature subjects each year as well as a large n u m b e r of short subjects.
As a result of the reduction in costs, short subjects are now being produced at a figure which
the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in
certain foreign countries n o w at war are no longer available.
EFFECT OF THE WAR
The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been serious and the
full measure thereof cannot yet be determined. It has been impossible to effect an orderly
release of the Company's pictures in any of the countries at war and in many countries it has
been impossible to effect any release whatsoever. In fact, in most of the territories dominated
by the Axis Powers, the release of American pictures has been forbidden. In addition, currency restrictions and regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, have served to
reduce further the Company's income from such pictures as were already released in foreign
countries.
PRODUCT
During the year, the Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., the organization currently distributing our pictures, one feature picture and ten short subjects and has in current
production a n u m b e r of other features and short subjects. Developments in connection with
the Company's product are summarized as follows:
PINOCCHIO:
PINOCCHIO was first shown at the Center Theatre in New York on February 7, 1940, and
at the Pantages and Hillstreet Theatres in Los Angeles on February 10, 1940. It was subsequently released for general exhibition on February 23, 1940. To the end of the Company's fiscal year, September 28, 1940, this picture had earned gross world film rentals of $ 1,673,956.54
of which $1,627,331.79 represented film rentals from the United States and Canada. The
Company has received from its distributors as its net share of the world film rentals,

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/3

30

ernic and Craig: Accountability and rhetoric during a crisis: Walt Disney's 1940 letter to stockhol
Amernic and Craig: Disney's Letter to Stockholders

79

$976,211.94. In addition, there have accrued to the credit of the Company, certain funds in
Great Britain and Australasia amounting to £5818.7.5, which have been blocked by currency
restrictions.
The Company has prepared Spanish and Portuguese language versions of this picture
which are currently being shown in all the countries of Central and South America, as well as
in the Philippine Islands and Portugal. No income from the Spanish and Portuguese language
versions of PINOCCHIO is reflected in the above-mentioned film rentals as the picture was
released in those countries too late for any such revenue to be included in the year ended
September 28, 1940.
The total cost of producing PINOCCHIO was $2,595,379.66 and it is n o w anticipated that
this amount will not be recouped under the conditions prevailing throughout the world.
Accordingly, a charge of $1,000,000 has been made to provide for the excess of cost of this picture over the estimated total revenue.
The picture PINOCCHIO was planned and production was started prior to the outbreak
of the European war. Consequently, it was budgeted on a program contemplating income from
all countries where SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS had been released. In addition,
this production suffered from excessive cost which was a direct result of the transition period
through which the Company passed w h e n it changed its policy of making one feature in two
years (SNOW WHITE was released in January, 1938), to a policy of producing from two to four
features a year as presently projected. These excessive costs cannot be segregated as they very
largely represent discarded work of untrained personnel. PINOCCHIO was produced during a
period of development and expansion. These factors which included the schooling and training of personnel to meet the increased production needs, together with inadequate plant facilities at the old studios, contributed in no small measure to the high cost of this production.
FANTASIA:
FANTASIA was exhibited for the first time at the Broadway Theatre in New York on
November 13, 1940. This picture is an innovation in the field of entertainment, featuring
Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra in a program of music as interpreted by
Walt Disney and the Company's staff of artists and technicians. FANTASIA is being presented
by methods never before employed in the exhibition of motion pictures. The exhibition of this
production requires special sound equipment and the Company has contracted to purchase
sufficient equipment so that the picture can be distributed simultaneously in twelve theatres.
It is now planned to distribute the picture by the "road show" method in the first-run cities of
the United States, Canada and other large centers. The management believes this method of
distribution will result in an eventual realization of revenue in excess of that which would be
realized by ordinary methods of distribution. However, this method of distribution will require
a longer period of time for the Company to recoup the cost of the picture.
OTHER FEATURES:
Three other feature length pictures currently in production are planned for release during the fiscal year ending September 27, 1941. THE RELUCTANT DRAGON is a combination of
animated cartoon and "live action" comedy, featuring the well-known humorist, Robert
Benchley BAMBI is a dramatization, through the medium of the animated cartoon, of the wellknown book of the same name by Felix Salten. A distribution contract for both of the last-mentioned features has been entered into with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. The name and basic story
of the picture, DUMBO, THE FLYING ELEPHANT were purchased by the Company and are
being developed by our staff into a feature length cartoon.
Among the features scheduled for release in 1942 are PETER PAN and WIND IN THE WILLOWS.
SHORT SUBJECTS:
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940 the Company delivered to RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. a total of ten short subjects and contemplates delivery of twenty short subjects
during the fiscal year 1941. These pictures continue in high popular favor and should prove to
be a profitable part of the Company's business inasmuch as the increased efficiency made possible by the new plant has materially reduced production costs.
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The Company has recently extended its releasing contract with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.
to cover a fourth series of eighteen short subjects.
The Company presently has twenty-eight short subjects in various stages of production.
OTHER ENDEAVORS
Names and characters created by the Company and licensed for use on merchandise, etc. continue to have a wide-spread appeal. Royalties from this source, from books and music, and revenue from comic strips and art sales, constitute a substantial portion of the income of the
Company.
GENERAL
The inventory of pictures in process at the close of the fiscal year was the largest in the
Company's history. The total cost of the feature length and short subjects in production was
$3,650,256.67. These pictures represented a total film length of 44,490 feet. In addition there
were 149 stories in our inventory on which we had spent $367,275.41. The system of budget
control both as to cost and output was revised w h e n the Company moved to the n e w studio,
with the result that both feature pictures and short subjects are presently being completed on
schedule and at their budgeted costs.
Your management has reduced expenses and has taken aggressive steps toward lowering
production costs by increasing efficiency and eliminating dispensable activities.
In considering the profit and loss statement of the Company, it is worth while to repeat
the following statement made in the prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred Stock:
"The Company's principal income accrues according to the rapidity with which its features are
exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, the relationship between dates of release and dates of
accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to produce wide variations in earnings as they may from time to time be reported. This is made more
pronounced by a program which contemplates the release of only one or two features per year.
In connection with SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the Company adopted a policy
of writing off the entire cost of the picture against the first revenues received, and the
Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions.
Consequently, if any given accounting period closes at a time w h e n revenues have failed to
exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released during such
period, it is possible that a loss may be reported in such period notwithstanding the fact that
an actual profit may eventually be realized on such feature."
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940, the Company had only one new feature
picture-PINOCCHIO-in release.
The Company also re-issued SNOW WHITE in the United States and Canada in July, 1940.
This was released as the WALT DISNEY FESTIVAL in conjunction with four Walt Disney short
subjects and is currently doing a satisfactory business.
During the next fiscal year ending September 27, 1941, the Company expects to have
three new feature pictures in general release, in addition to its quota of n e w short subjects.
These pictures should reflect the benefit accruing to the Company by reason of the training
and skill acquired by the artists during the last three years. While the serious effect on the
Company's business caused by the loss of foreign markets cannot be minimized, nevertheless
your management now believes it has adjusted the Company's operations to a schedule of production and costs designed to be independent of those markets.
CAPITAL STOCK
At a meeting of the directors held on February 24, 1940, the capital stock of the Company was
reclassified into 755,000 shares, of which 600,000 shares were designated as Common Stock
(with a par value of $5 a share), and 155,000 shares were designated as 6% Cumulative
Convertible Preferred Stock (with a par value of $25 per share). 300,000 shares of Common
Stock ($5 par value) were thereupon issued in exchange for 150,000 shares of Common Stock
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($10 par value) previously outstanding, and 45,000 shares of Common Stock were issued as a
15% stock dividend on the new amount of outstanding stock. 10,000 shares of Common Stock
were issued to Walter E. Disney and Roy O. Disney in consideration of the cancellation of
$200,000 indebtedness of the Company to them. 150,000 shares of preferred Stock were sold
to the public through underwriters for net proceeds of $3,412,500 and 5,000 shares were sold
to officers and employees for $125,000.
An initial dividend of 37 l / 2 c was paid July 1, 1940, to the Preferred stockholders of
record June 15, 1940, and a regular quarterly dividend of 37 l / 2 c was paid October 1, 1940, to
Preferred stockholders of record September 16, 1940. The regular quarterly dividend of 37
l/2c payable January 1, 1941, to Preferred stockholders of record December 16, 1940, was
declared by the Board of Directors at a meeting held December 2, 1940. This dividend will be
paid from the Company's initial surplus. No dividends were paid on the Common Stock.
DIRECTORS
During the year, Edward M. Francis resigned as a director of the Company and in his place the
board elected Jonathan B. Lovelace as the representative of the Preferred stockholders in anticipation of Paragraph 9 of Article 5 of the Articles of Incorporation, as amended, which provides that:
"Holders of the Preferred Stock, voting separately as a class and entitled to one vote per share,
shall be entitled at the first annual meeting of the Corporation after the close of the fiscal year
ending September 28, 1940, and annually thereafter, to elect one Director of the Corporation
to hold office for a term of one (1) year and until his successor shall have been elected.''
EMPLOYEES
At September 28, 1940, the organization consisted of a total of 1179 employees.
The Directors want to take this opportunity of thanking all members of the organization,
whose loyalty and co-operation have contributed in such large measure to the continued
progress of the Company.
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
WALTER E. DISNEY, President.
APPENDIX 2
Letter to Stockholders for the 1941 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report
To the Stockholders

of Walt Disney

Productions:

We submit herewith as part of this annual report to stockholders financial statements of
the Company for the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, accompanied by the report of the
Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. We direct your attention to the notes
which are attached to and constitute an integral part of the financial statements.
FOREWORD
In our annual report to stockholders issued in December, 1940, and covering the fiscal
year ended September 28, 1940, we stated, "the effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of
your Company has been serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined." It was
evident that the loss of foreign markets necessitated a sharp lowering in production costs in
order to assure a profit from the remaining markets. The Company immediately took steps
toward that objective. Since the date of that report there has been a further deterioration in
the foreign markets and the Company again found it necessary to reduce materially its operating expenses and personnel in order to consolidate its position. As this program was being
placed in effect, a strike was called by a minority group of the Company's employees. This
development, discussed later in this report under the heading "Labor Relations," resulted in a
retardation of our production schedule and interfered with the delivery and exhibition of
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product already completed.
Following is a summary of income account and balance sheet items taken from the financial statements published on pages 8 to 10 of this report, compared with corresponding figures in last year's report:
Fiscal year
Income Account
Income from short subjects less
amortization
Income from royalties, comic strips,
art work, licenses, etc., less costs
Income from "Snow White and
the Seven Dwarfs"
Total
Administrative and selling expenses
Balance
Interest expense
Profit (loss) before provision
for losses on features
Provision for excess cost of features
over estimated net income
Balance (loss)
Balance Sheets
Cash and receivables
Inventories at cost:
Pictures in process, etc.
Unamortized picture costs
Total current and working assets,
before deducting reserves
Deduct provision for excess of
cost over estimated net income
from feature pictures
Current and working assets
as per balance sheet
Bank loans
Other liabilities, reserve for taxes
and deferred income
Total liabilities
Excess of current and working assets (as stated) over all liabilities
Deposits in foreign banks at current
rates
Land, buildings and equipment at
cost less reserve for depreciation
Copyrights, trademarks and patents
less reserve for amortization
Deferred charges
Total net assets, as per balance
sheet
Funds not taken into books
representing blocked currencies at
current official rates, approximately

1941

1940

$ 457,391.61

$ 131,668.88

185,253.97

267,898.90

Increase
(decrease)
$325,722.73
(82,644.93)

139,173.23
$ 781,818.81
420,127.32
$ 361,691.49
150,988.55

103,526.10
$ 503,093.88
649,354.68
$ (146,260.80)
113,537.25

35,647.13
$ 278,724.93
(229,227.36)
$ 507,952.29
37,451.30

$ 210,702.94

$ (259,798.05)

$ 470,500.99

1,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

$(789,297.06)

$(1,259,798.05)

$ 470,500.99

September
27, 1941
$ 156,020.52

September
28, 1940
$ 132,410.20

Increase
(decrease)
$ 23,610.32

2,882,713.43
4,874,006.16

4,093,119.94
1,833,436.66

(1,210,406.51)
3,040,569.50

$7,912,740.11

$6,058,966.80

$1,853,773.31

2,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

$5,912,740.11
$3,371,669.03

$5,058,966.80
$1,932,992.24

$ 853,773.31
$1,438,676.79

907.273.30
$4,278,942.33

841,499.11
$2,774,491.35

65,774.19
$1,504,450.98

$1,633,797.78

$2,284,475.45

$ (650,677.67)

1,060.61

1,088.70

(28.09)

3,005,161.18

3,263,170.31

(258,009.13)

7,892.77
234,186.31

8,613.67
230,297.68

(720.90)
3,888.73

$4,882,098.75

$5,787,645.81

345,000.00

22,000.00

$ (905,547.06)

323,000.00

The comparative figures taken from the income account show the progress made in
reduction of costs. The Company shows a profit, after all charges but before provision for
excess cost of feature pictures over estimated net income therefrom, of $210,702.94 as com-
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pared with a loss of $259,798.05 in the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940. The income
account does not reflect the reduction in costs of feature pictures as DUMBO was not released
until after the close of the fiscal year. It does, however, reflect the working off of the inventory of high cost shorts and restoration of a satisfactory profit in that division. Last year the
Company provided a reserve of $1,000,000 to write off the excess cost of PINOCCHIO. The
Company has estimated its expectancy of return from all of its feature product, and as a result
has set u p a provision against a possible loss in the amount of $ 1,000,000.
The comparative figures taken from the Balance Sheet show that while pictures in
process have decreased $1,210,406.51, the unamortized value of completed pictures has
increased $3,040,569.50, giving a net increase in inventory (before reserve) of $1,830,162.99.
This increase, which was largely financed by bank loans, is due primarily to the delay in the
general release of FANTASIA, and to labor difficulties experienced at the time of release of THE
RELUCTANT DRAGON. The Company now has two feature pictures ready for general release,
DUMBO and FANTASIA. A third feature, BAMBI, is practically completed. With current operations reduced by 50% from last year, a steady reduction of the bank loan is anticipated.
Blocked currencies are not included in the Company's accounts until received. In
October, 1941, the British Government entered into an agreement with the motion picture
companies whereby 50% of the blocked currencies previously impounded in Great Britain was
released. One-half of this amount was immediately payable and one-half is payable in April,
1942. The Company, since the date of this report, has received approximately $65,000 as part
payment of its share of impounded funds. Australia and New Zealand have not yet released any
of that portion of our revenue which those countries impounded.
PRODUCT
During the fiscal year under review the Company released its feature picture FANTASIA.
Initially this picture was distributed directly by the Company through the medium of road
shows using "Fantasound" rather than through normal distribution channels. The picture was
presented in thirteen cities (New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago,
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Minneapolis, Washington and Baltimore) and
while a few of the engagements were disappointing, the aggregate results indicated a picture
with wide appeal. The length of the New York and Los Angeles runs broke all existing records
since the advent of sound.
Experience gained from the exhibition of FANTASIA in the above-mentioned cities
demonstrated that a nation wide distribution of this picture with "Fantasound" was impractical. It was therefore decided to abandon "Fantasound" and generally release the picture
through normal distribution channels. Our sound engineers succeeded in combining the various "Fantasound" tracks into one composite track, enabling the Company to present FANTASIA in motion pictures everywhere.
The company entered into an agreement with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. for the distribution of FANTASIA throughout the world. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been prepared
for the South American market, and the picture has already been released in Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina. FANTASIA is also being
currently released in England and Australasia.
It is now planned to place FANTASIA in general distribution in the United States immediately following DUMBO. In preparation for this general release, test runs were made in representative small towns to guide in editing this picture.
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON
This picture was completed and delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on April 17, 1941.
It was first put into general release on June 20, 1941. Revenues obtained from this picture were
seriously affected by the strike, due to picketing at various theatres throughout the country. It
has been released in Great Britain and Australasia. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been
prepared for the release of the picture in South America.
Although results to date have been disappointing, we are confident of the return to the
Company of at least $500,000 and have provided in the inventory reserve for the balance of
the cost.
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DUMBO
DUMBO was completed and delivered to our distributor September 11, 1941. Because of
selling conditions in the industry the picture was not generally released until the middle of
December. The picture was pre-shown in the Broadway Theatre, New York, beginning
October 23rd, and has b e e n well received. In the trade and press it is getting excellent
exploitation and publicity.
DUMBO is our first all-cartoon feature picture budgeted and produced subsequent to the
outbreak of the European war and the loss of our foreign markets. The picture was produced
at a cost well within present market possibilities and is of a quality that assures, in our opinion,
a profitable return.
SHORT SUBJECTS
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, the Company delivered to RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. a total of twenty-two short subjects. Our costs have been reduced to meet present
market conditions and the pictures continue to be a profitable source of revenue.
Under date of April 11, 1941, the Company extended its releasing contract with RKO to
cover a fifth series of eighteen short subjects.
The Company now has 22 short subjects in various stages of production.
BAMBI
The Company's feature picture BAMBI has been in work for over three years and is n o w
practically completed. As now scheduled it will be delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on or
about the first of February, 1942. Completion of this picture was delayed at least three m o n t h s
by the strike. It was the last of the feature pictures projected on the basis of the pre-war markets. Its cost will be substantially higher than DUMBO but will be approximately $1,000,000
less than the cost of PINOCCHIO. It is the consensus of opinion of those w h o have seen the
picture that it is the best the Company has ever produced for entertainment value and quality
of production.
FEATURES RELEASED IN PRIOR YEARS
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, PINOCCHIO, which was first shown on
February 7, 1940, returned a gross film rental of $554,730.74 of which the Company's share
amounted to $387,100.12. This brought the total gross film rental on September 27, 1941, to
$2,228,687.28 of which the Company's share was $1,363,312.06. The amount received in 1941
would seem to assure recoupment of the balance of the unamortized negative cost of
$233,439.64 after giving effect to the reserve set u p last year. The Company's share of blocked
currencies resulting from the showings of PINOCCHIO had a value at official rates of approximately $240,000 at September 27, 1941. This amount is not included in the figures quoted
above.
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS which was first shown in December of 1937
returned to the Company the sum of $139,173.23 in the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941.
OTHER ENDEAVORS
The licensing of names and characters created by the Company continues to have universal commercial appeal but revenue has fallen off during the year mainly because FANTASIA
did not lend itself readily to such exploitation. Certain of our licensees also were beginning to
feel the effect of defense priorities. However, royalties from this source and from books, music,
comic strips and art sales continue to be substantial sources of income.
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LABOR RELATIONS
For the first time in its history the company was, during 1941, beset by labor troubles.
Early in May the Studio launched a program of reducing operating expenses and personnel,
designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution
of the Company's pictures under present world conditions. As this policy was being initiated,
a strike was called (on May 28, 1941) by Screen Cartoonists Union, Local No. 852, an affiliate
of the International Brotherhood of Painters, Paperhangers and Decorators of America (A. F.
of L.). A majority of our employees stayed at work and during the nine weeks of the strike the
Company's production proceeded satisfactorily. However, due to secondary boycotts and "hot
cargo'' activities on the part of sympathetic unions it became impossible to deliver and exhibit our product.
Repeated efforts by the Company to effect a settlement were unavailing. Finally, a commissioner from the National Conciliator's Office intervened; arbitration was agreed upon and
an award was eventually rendered. Among other things, the award imposed the following: a
close shop; reinstatement of all strikers; and 100 hours' retroactive pay for strikers. In relation
to our proposed reduction of personnel, the award also imposed a formula under which a certain percentage of strikers had to be retained pro rata to non-striking employees. However, it
required the Union to take in as a body without prejudice and at a nominal initiation fee
employees in its classification w h o had remained at work during the strike.
After a period of four weeks of complete shutdown, necessitated by protracted negotiations, the Company resumed operations on September 15, 1941. The Studio is now operating
under the terms of the award which, unfortunately, is in many respects very ambiguous and is
silent on several disputed issues. However, the plant is now operating smoothly.
DIVIDENDS AND SINKING FUND REQUIREMENTS
In a letter addressed to the stockholders under date of June 14, 1941, you were advised of
the reason for the omission of the preferred stock sinking fund payment due April 1, 1941, in
the amount of $50,000 and of the deferment of the quarterly preferred dividend due July 1,
1941. The necessity for conserving working capital pending the orderly liquidation of the
Company's inventory of completed feature pictures caused omission of the $100,000 preferred stock sinking fund payment due October 1, 1941, and deferment of the quarterly dividend on the preferred stock due on that date. Consideration will be given to resumption of
payments w h e n and as a comfortable working capital position has been re-established, but no
prediction can be made in this respect at this time. The dividends on the preferred stock being
cumulative, all arrearages in such dividends as well as fixed sinking fund payments must be
paid before any dividends may be paid on the common stock.
GENERAL
Our principal problem now is one of orderly and satisfactory liquidation of feature product. Within the Studio production is going forward and costs are in keeping with present markets. The Company is operating with less than 50% of the personnel and pay roll of May, 1941.
Our working capital position is strained because of the large amount of money tied u p in feature negatives--DUMBO, FANTASIA and BAMBI. With proper liquidation of these three features, it is believed the Company will reduce its bank loan to a nominal figure or liquidate it
completely and restore its working capital position to a satisfactory level. DUMBO and BAMBI
are feature pictures which will have none of the problems of distribution presented by FANTASIA. Both are excellent pictures and should do satisfactory business.
For the current year, the Company is continuing its production of short subjects and has
three feature subjects available for production, of which o n e would ordinarily b e completed
during the 1942 fiscal year. However, your management is making its facilities and equipment
available for Army, Navy and other Government films in connection with national defense. We
are now working on short subjects in cooperation with our Government's plans to p r o m o t e
hemispheric solidarity and are also producing a series of short subjects for the U. S. Navy and
five short subjects for the Canadian Government. New feature product is being curtailed in
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favor of federal defense work. The volume of defense film work required of us will determine
the extent of work done on feature subjects during the current year.
In summary, we are still in an adjustment period brought about by world conditions and
the consequent loss of markets, but we believe we have sustained the major shocks of this
adjustment. Pictures being projected will be properly budgeted and produced for present
restricted markets. Our experience with DUMBO and our short subjects gives us every confidence in our ability to meet these conditions satisfactorily with respect both to cost and quality of our product.
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Walter E. Disney, President
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